We construct a framework of rm dynamics to evaluate the impact of the enforcement of contracts between nal goods producers and their intermediate goods suppliers on rm life-cycle growth, technology accumulation and aggregate productivity. We build upon the tractable contracts model of Acemoglu et al. (2007) , where the nal goods rm chooses technology in contractible activities conducted by suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers select investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating the payos of a bargaining game with the producer of the nal goods. We show that contractual incompleteness implies a wedge on prots for producers of nal goods, potentially dependent on the level of technology of the rm, which disincentives technology accumulation at the rm level in our dynamic model. We evaluate this mechanism in general equilibrium to analyze its quantitative implications. Our model accounts for dierences in output per worker of up to 33 percent across economies with complete and incomplete contracts. The impact on rm life-cycle growth, the age and size distribution of rms is quantitatively signicant. JEL Classication: D86, E23, O11, O40.
Introduction
A fundamental area of research in macroeconomics and development is identifying sources of distortions that account for signicant dierences in total factor productivity (TFP) and output per capita across countries. A recent literature has focused on the analysis of these distortions at the rm level and the consequences for aggregate TFP dierences.
1 It is understood that idiosyncratic distortions not only aect the allocation of inputs of production across rms but also the incentives to invest in technology and productivity within the rm. Both channels potentially have, at least in theory, a signicant impact on aggregate productivity. Identifying the sources of these distortions is of paramount importance to assist the design of economic policies aiming at promoting economic development. In turn, the development of quantitative frameworks provides useful insights that contribute to understand the mechanisms and the potential impact of dierent distortions faced by rms on aggregate outcomes.
We construct a dynamic framework of heterogeneous rms to evaluate the impact of contract enforcement on rm life-cycle growth and aggregate productivity.
We build upon the model of Acemoglu et al. (2007) , who provide a tractable structure where rms that produce nal goods (henceforth, a rm) need to procure intermediate goods from suppliers. The rst building block of this model is the representation of technology as the range of intermediate inputs used by rms. The second building block is the well established approach to incomplete-contracting models of the rm originated by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . The producer of nal goods decides the range of intermediate goods that it will use. This range represents the technology of the rm: a more advanced technology is more productive, but entails more costs in terms of direct pecuniary costs as well as those that emerge from contracting with more suppliers. Suppliers undertake relationshipspecic activities, some of which are contractible while the rest are nonveriable and noncontractible. The range of contractible activities in an economy represents the quality of its contracting institutions. Producers of nal goods can choose the investment levels in contractible activities by the supplier of each intermediate good.
However, suppliers choose investment in noncontractible activities, a decision that anticipates the results of a bargaining game. This results in an allocation of resources that is not ecient: suppliers tend to underinvest in nonctractible activities given that they are not the full residual claimants of the output gains obtained from their investments. In a static setup, Acemoglu et al. (2007) show that contractual incompleteness has a negative impact on technology adoption and can potentially generate sizable productivity dierences across countries.
We expand the analysis of this friction by analyzing its impact in a framework of rm dynamics (Hopenhayn, 1992; Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993) . This approach allows us to make a contribution that we outline in the following manner. First, we show that the friction under study implies a wedge (or distortion equivalent to a tax) on prots, that is dependent on the technology level of the rm. Second, we describe 1 See Banerjee and Duo (2005) , Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) , Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . We provide an overview of the literature below.
how this wedge aects not only the size of the rm but also the dynamic incentives to invest in technology and productivity within the rm, which will determine the life-cycle growth prole of rms and aggregate productivity. Additionally, we demonstrate its impact on the age and size distribution of rms. Third, our analysis allows us to connect our quantitative results with the literature that studies alternative frictions in similar theoretical frameworks. For example, an extensive literature has studied the role of nancial frictions, by examining alternative specications, calibrations and margins through which they aect aggregate productivity.
2 A similar comparison can be made with the literature that studies rm entry costs or labor market regulation. Based on our quantitative results, which we summarize next, we make the point that frictions that distort the ability of rms to make contracts with suppliers deserve similar attention. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to explore the role of rm-supplier contract enforcement in a quantitative framework of rm dynamics.
For our quantitative analysis we consider the US economy as a benchmark and calibrate our model under the assumption that there is contract completeness. Some of the parameters are standard and obtained from the literature of rm dynamics, while others are calibrated to replicate key statistics of the US economy, such as rm exit rates, rm life-cycle growth, and the distribution of employment by age of the rm. We then document how the economy performs, in general equilibrium, as the range of contractible activities is reduced. This aects the investment in technology at the rm level, the age and size distribution of rms and aggregate productivity.
Our model explains up to a 33% dierence in output per worker across economies, which is comparable to losses generated by nancial frictions in similar quantitative models. Furthermore we attain considerable dierences in rm growth when comparing economies with and without contract incompleteness: average rm size for 26 to 30 year old rms is 2.6 times that of young rms when contracts are complete (this gure is replicated by calibration in the baseline reference), while rm growth is negligible when contracts are incomplete. Finally, the role of key parameters of the model is assessed.
Relation to the Literature
Our work is related to dierent strands of the literature on rm dynamics, misallocation and aggregate productivity. It is connected to the literature that evaluates the eects of idiosyncratic distortions, in models where productivity is endogenous (see Bhattacharya et al., 2013; Gabler and Poschke, 2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2014; Ranasinghe, 2014; Alvarez Parra and Toledo, 2015; Buera and Fattal-Jaef, 2016; Bento and Restuccia, 2017; Da-Rocha et al., 2017) . The analysis of these models has shown that assuming an exogenous distribution of rm productivity can lead to the underestimation of the consequences of distortions that aect the allocation of resources across production units. Distortions can aect incentives to improve pro-ductivity, which adds to the eect on the allocation of resources across rms, thus generating an amplication mechanism. This eect can be particularly detrimental when distortions are more severe for the most productive rms, often termed correlated distortions, as in Bento and Restuccia (2017) . 3
Related to the previous line of research, we contribute to the literature that aims to identify and evaluate the sources of size dependent distortions and distortions faced by rms in general. For example, D'Erasmo and Moscoso-Boedo (2012), Busso et al. (2012) , Ulyssea (2018) , López (2017), and Lopez-Martin (2016) , among others, analyze tax evasion or the informal sector.
4 Lagos (2006) , Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama (2011), Da-Rocha et al. (2016) , Mukoyama and Osotimehin (2017) , López and Torres (2018) evaluate the eects of worker ring costs and labor market regulation. Cole et al. (2016) develop a dynamic costly state verication model of venture capital. This friction aects the incentives to invest in dierent technologies that determine the life cycle growth of rms, the age and size distribution of rms, and aggregate productivity. A series of papers have evaluated the role of crime and extortion (Hill and Perez-Reyna, 2015; Ranasinghe and Restuccia, 2018; Ranasinghe and Restuccia, 2018) and size-dependent policies and tax enforcement (Guner et al., 2008; Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas, 2014; Gourio and Roys, 2014; Garicano et al., 2016; Amirapu and Gechter, 2018; Bachas et al., 2018) . In line with this general
area of research, we analyze a particular source of distortions, potentially correlated with rm productivity or technology, which generates disincentives for investment in innovation and rm growth. Mukoyama and Popov (2015) is perhaps most closely related to our work.
They embed the contract incompleteness setup of Acemoglu et al. (2007) in a dynamic general equilibrium model with evolving institutions during the process of industrialization. They show that incompleteness of contracts leads to two types of misallocation that generate production ineciency: unbalanced use of inputs and unbalanced production of dierent goods. In their model, the government is allowed to invest in enforcement institutions to improve the contractual environment, which allows them to analyze how dierent types of governments choose dierent patterns of institutional investment over time.
5 Boehm and Obereld (2018) use microdata on Indian manufacturing rms to show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement. We nd these works, as well as their forceful motivation of the study of contract enforcement, complementary to ours.
Quantitative Framework
We consider an economy where a continuum of rms produce an homogeneous nal good. We will refer to these production units as rms, as opposed to intermediate good suppliers. These rms purchase intermediate goods from suppliers, while suppliers need to invest in a range of activities to deliver the intermediate goods.
Firms invest each period to improve their technology level, this level of technology refers to the measure of intermediate goods (a higher level of technology implies a larger range of intermediate goods). We rst describe the static problem and the contracting problem faced by rms following Acemoglu et al. (2007) , in our version of the model the technology level is given in any period. Then we describe the dynamic problem of rms, that decide how much to invest in improving their technology level for the next period. We assume that there is a representative household endowed with a unit of time that is inelastically supplied to rms as labor.
Technology and Payos
Denote the technology level of a rm by n ∈ R + , which represents the range of intermediate goods the rm can use in production. In this sense, a higher n represents a more complex nal good. For each j ∈ [0, n], x(j) is the quantity of intermediate input j. The output function derived from the production technology follows Acemoglu et al. (2007) , to which we add a term with decreasing returns to scale in labor:
with κ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. Parameter α determines the degree of complementarity between inputs, so that the elasticity of substitution is 1/(1 − α). Parameter κ controls the elasticity of output with respect to the level of the technology, while ν governs the decreasing marginal productivity of labor.
There is a large number of prot-maximizing suppliers that produce the intermediate goods, who have an outside option ω. The supplier of an intermediate input makes a relationship-specic investment, with constant marginal cost c x for each activity necessary for production, which we consider to be in terms of the cost of labor.
7
The production function of intermediate inputs is Cobb-Douglas and symmetric in the activities is given by:
where x(i, j) is the level of investment in activity i performed by the supplier of input j. Payment to supplier j consists of two parts: an ex ante payment τ (j) ∈ R 6 We will later consider a version of the model with physical capital. 7 In general equilibrium the wage level will go down as contract institutions worsen, reducing the marginal cost of the activities of suppliers and, to some extent, moderating the negative eects of more adverse conditions (in this sense, the results are conservative). before the investments x(i, j) take place and payment s(j) after these investments are completed. The payo to supplier j, taking into account her outside option:
The prots of the rm are:
where w is the wage rate.
Equilibrium under Complete Contracts
We rst consider a benchmark economy where contracts are complete (i.e. the rst best). With complete contracts a rm pays each supplier the outside option: it
We consider a subgame perfect equilibrium, that can be represented as a solution to the following problem: (2) and the participation constraint of suppliers:
This last condition is satised with equality in equilibrium, so there are no rents for suppliers. Since all activities are symmetric, the rm chooses the same investment level x for all activities in all intermediate inputs. With this condition the problem becomes:
Notice that (3) is strictly concave in x and l as long as 1 − β − ν > 0.
Lemma 1 in Appendix A shows that the values for activities and labor under complete contracts are given by:
and production is:
Equilibrium under Incomplete Contracts
We now consider an economy with incomplete contracts. Contract incompleteness is modeled as the fraction of activities that are not contractible. That is, for every intermediate input, we dene µ ∈ [0, 1] such that investments in activities 0 ≤ i ≤ µ are observable and contractible, while µ < i ≤ 1 are not contractible. The contract stipulates investments for the contractible activities but not for the 1 − µ noncontractible activities: suppliers will decide investment in 1 − µ in anticipation of the ex-post distribution of revenue.
The timing is as follows: z and n are xed at the beginning of the period.
The rm hires labor l,
is an upfront payment to supplier j (can be positive or negative).
Potential suppliers decide whether to apply for the contracts.
Suppliers and rm bargain over the division of revenue (suppliers can withhold their services in noncontractible activities).
Output y is produced and distributed.
Following to Acemoglu et al. (2007) , we consider a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and we denote hired labor, investment in contractible activities, investment in noncontractible activities, and upfront payment to suppliers by {l,x c ,x n ,τ }. A SSPE is solved by backward induction, at the penultimate stage of the game given l and x c .
We are interested in constructing a symmetric equilibrium, suppose x n (−j) is investment in noncontractible activities for all suppliers other than j, while investment by supplier j is x n (j). Denote the Shapley value of supplier j by
for which an explicit expression is derived below. In equilibrium, symmetry is satised x n (j) = x n (−j), so x n is a xed point given by:
In a symmetric equilibrium output of the rm is given by y = z 1−β (n κ+1 x µ c x 1−µ n ) β l ν . The Shapley value of the rm is obtained as a residual:
The contract oered by the nal-good rm has to satisfy the participation constraint for suppliers:
The maximization problem of the (nal good) rm is: (6) and (7).
We can obtain τ from the participation constraint that will be satised with equality in equilibrium, then: (6), and the upfront payment needs to satisfy:
α α+β is interpreted as the bargaining power of the rm, increasing in α and decreasing in β. The role of these parameters is discussed with more detail below.
Characterization of Equilibrium
Using the incentive compatibility constraint, the problem of the supplier is given by
In this problem there are two dierences with respect to the rst best. First, the supplier receives a fraction β α+β , so the supplier is not a full residual claimant of the return to its investment in noncontractible activities and thus underinvests relative to the optimal level. Second, multilateral bargaining distorts the concavity of the private return. The solution is obtained from the rst-order condition of the problem and solving for the xed point x n (j) = x n , this results in a unique x n :
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Taking this as given the problem of the rm is:
In Appendix A we prove that
where
Notice that h 1 (1) = 1 and h 1 (µ) > 0, so x c ≤ x and h 2 (1) = α α+β and h 2 (µ) > 0, so x n < x c . This implies, y i < y. Furthermore, since nc x x = βy and wl = νy, we can express prots under complete and incomplete contracts as, respectively:
We discuss below how incomplete contracts generate a distortion that depends on the technology level of the rm, in the spirit of Bento and Restuccia (2017).
Dynamic Problem of the Firm
We now describe the dynamic problem of rms. Technology n, a state variable, is accumulated over time with investment in a stochastic innovation technology. The dynamic problem of the rm can be written in recursive form as follows:
where π(z, n) is the level of prots, whether with complete or incomplete markets, that depends on the level of technology n and the stochastic productivity shock z, e are expenditures in the innovation technology, γ is the discount parameter and φ is an exogenous exit shock. The per-period xed cost of production c f generates exit of rms while the exit value when a rm decides to close down is v. Firm productivity evolves according to a discrete Markov process Λ(z | z).
In every period rms can invest in the innovation good e to increase the stock of technology.
8 Three outcomes are possible every period, depending on the amount of investment in the innovation good in the previous period: technology may increase by a proportion ψ, it may remain constant, or decrease by ψ.
Technology is dened on the grid {n, n (1+ψ), n (1+ψ) 2 , ... , n}, where n and n are the lowest and highest possible levels of technology, respectively. The probability of a successful outcome is given by:
There are diminishing returns to innovation investment e. Fixing a probability of success in innovation, P (n (1 + ψ) | n, e), the necessary investment in innovation goods e to increase the productivity of the rm by a xed percentage is proportional to technology n. Parameter ξ determines the expected return to investment in innovation. The probability of a negative outcome is given by:
The level of technology level n summarizes the history of investment and success in innovations and governs the size of the rm (Klette and Kortum 2004) . Furthermore, it is lost when the rm closes, regardless of whether exit is due to an exogenous exit shock or it is optimal to close the rm. Finally, technology is assumed to be rm-specic and there is no market for its trade.
Entry of New Firms
A new rm enters with an initial level of technology n. The value of a potential entering rm, net of the entry cost, is given by:
where F (z) is the unconditional distribution of idiosyncratic rm productivity z. In equilibrium a break-even condition needs to be satised v e = 0.
Representative Household
We close the model by assuming that there is an innitely lived representative household with preferences over consumption sequences given by:
with c t denoting consumption in period t, γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, u(c) is assumed to satisfy standard conditions.
The household has a unit endowment of labor that is inelastically supplied in the market. Resources for the household are c = d + w − en + ex, where en denotes aggregate creations costs, ex is the aggregate exit value of rms, d denotes aggregate dividends from the rms and suppliers. We focus on the stationary equilibrium of this economy, where prices and aggregate variables are constant.
Parameters and Calibration
We start our analysis with the baseline model. As is standard in the literature, we set parameter values that jointly contribute to replicate key statistics of the U.S.
economy. The critical institutional parameter µ represents the share of activities, of each intermediate input, for which investment is observable and contractible. For the undistorted economy we assume µ is equal to 1, which implies perfect markets.
In the quantitative nancial development literature, for example, assuming perfect markets is standard for the U.S.
Predetermined Parameters
We rst enumerate the set of predetermined parameters in Table 1 The returns to scale in the production function are jointly determined by ν and β. In Acemoglu et al. (2007) , the authors consider a monopolistic competition framework, where β determines the elasticity of demand. Their benchmark value for this parameter is 0.75, in a model without labor or physical capital. This number is consistent with the generally accepted range of the elasticity of substitution between nal-good varieties.
In our setup, we need to take into account several issues. First, the returns to scale are determined by ν and β, so that their sum should be in line with span-ofcontrol values in the literature or its equivalent curvature in monopolistic competition models (e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008) . Second, the weight given to intermediate inputs is larger than the weight on labor and capital (e.g., Gopinath and Neiman, 2014) . Third, as we will show below, we require ν + β(κ + 1) < 1 in order to have a wedge that is increasing in the level of technology n, which is the relevant case. With these considerations in mind, we set ν and β equal to 0.40 and 0.45, respectively. Nevertheless, we discuss below how our main results change with dierent values.
The value of α determines the degree of complementarity between intermediate inputs. This parameter is not relevant for calibration, since it does not enter the problem of the rms under complete contracts. However, it does aect the impact of worse judicial institutions given its role in the bargaining process: as α increases, The exogenous productivity component of the production function z follows an AR(1) process, with an autocorrelation parameter of 0.60 and a volatility parameter of 0.25, which are in middle of the ranges in the literature, respectively, for their values (for a discussion see Lopez-Martin, 2016) . These parameters are not quantitatively relevant for our quantitative results since we look at the size and productivity-growth of rms in the long run. In our setup they will, jointly with other parameters, contribute to determine moments such as exit rates by age and size, and the size and age-distribution of rms. 
Calibration
We now turn to our calibration approach, which we show in Table 2 . The perperiod xed cost of production c f , jointly with the exogenous probability of rm exit, denoted by φ, determine rm-exit rates in our model. In a stationary equilibrium, total exit and entry rates of rms are equal, we target a level of 0.10, consistent with the literature (e.g., Gabler and Poschke, 2013) . Large and productive rms are less likely to exit endogenously in this type of models, and thus their exit rates 9 These parameters are relevant in the literature of nancial constraints, since they govern the dispersion of the marginal products of capital. In our model there is no dispersion in the marginal product of labor across rms (or capital, in the alternative version of the model). The three remaining calibrated parameters mainly govern the growth dynamics of rms. The proportional size of each technology step is given by ψ, while the probability of an increase in technology, for a given level of investment, is determined by ξ. We target the growth pattern of rms using the data from Hsieh and Klenow (2014) for the U.S., at two points of their life-cycle: the size of survivors of age 6-10 relative to age 1-5, and the size of survivors of age 31-35 relative to age 1-5 (see Table 3 ). Firms grow faster when they are young, which requires a larger ψ; their growth moderates afterwards.
10 Parameter ω, which represents the outside option for suppliers, aects the growth dynamics of larger and more productive rms as it implies a cost that is increasing in the level of technology (see equation 3). The last target we consider is the share of employment in rms of age 41 or older (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014) .
10 The elasticity of labor with respect to the level of technology is given by β · κ/(1 − ν − β). See equation (4). We next discuss the t of the model along some non-target dimensions (see Table 3 ). Although we do not target the entire distribution of employment by age of the rm, the model replicates this properly. Furthermore, in the U.S. the upper tail of the size distribution accounts for a signicant part of employment: in our model rms with more than 500 workers account for 0.467 of total employment, compared to 0.496 in the data. In the baseline calibration the ratio of investment in technology to the production of nal goods is 0.076. This gure is comparable to the estimate of the ratio of investment in business intangible capital to domestic business value added of 0.064 by McGrattan and Prescott (2010) (see their Table A3 ).
We end this section with some clarications related to the solution and numerical implementation of the model. The algorithm for solving this type of models consists in normalizing the wage rate, then c e is computed as the value that, in equilibrium, satises the break-even condition with equality (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; D'Erasmo and Moscoso-Boedo, 2012) . The lower bound on the endogenous level of technology n is normalized. The upper bound n is set equal to a suciently large number so that it is not binding: we consider 35 levels of technology, while in our simulations the maximum step reached by rms is 18. The exogenous productivity component of the production function follows an AR(1) process, which is discretized following Tauchen (1986) to construct the Markov matrix Λ(z | z).
Model Mechanics
In this section we briey discuss how contract incompleteness implies a distortion, similar to a tax or wedge, that aects incentives to invest in technology and, therefore, average rm productivity growth and aggregate productivity of the economy. We analyze the mechanism by distinguishing between two eects: one static and one dynamic. First, we can show that, ceteris paribus (and in partial equilibrium, for the purposes of this section), a lower µ curtails rm size. Second, as previously mentioned, the distortion reduces incentives for the rm to invest in improving technology, this is the dynamic eect.
Notice from (10) that y i is increasing in µ, with better contracts rms will be bigger. The result is rather straightforward if we focus on inputs of production: when µ < 1 there is a wedge, 1 − h 3 (µ), that is decreasing in µ. A higher µ results in more input demand, and, therefore, increased production.
Since n is a dynamic decision, to analyze the second eect we focus on the wedge on prots, which generate the incentives for the rm to invest in improving their technology level (see (12)). In our model this wedge is increasing in n. To see why, recall from (11) that π = A y−ω n and π i = h 1 (µ) A y−ω n, where A = 1−β−ν, h 1 (µ) > 0 and h 1 (1) = 1. Consider
As long as β(κ + 1) + ν < 1, which is true in our benchmark parametrization, then g(n) ≡ (y/n) is strictly decreasing in n. Then
The wedge on prots is equal to 1 − π i π , so the inequality above implies that this wedge is increasing in n. That is, bigger rms are aected more by the friction than smaller rms. As µ increases, it is less costly to have a higher n. In our model ω, which is the outside option available to suppliers, plays a crucial role. If ω = 0, the wedge for rms would be equal to h 1 (µ), which does not depend on n. We would like to stress, however, that the wedge need not be increasing in n to aect investment in technology, a constant distortion is sucient to generate a dynamic disincentive to invest in technology.
Quantitative Analysis
In this section we discuss the main quantitative results. First, we document how contract completeness aects technology accumulation and growth at the rm level, with consequences for the age and size distribution of rms in general equilibrium, as well as aggregate productivity. Second, we analyze the role of dierent key parameters.
Baseline Quantitative Results
The main exercise consists of reducing µ, the parameter that represents completeness of contracts, starting from the baseline calibration.
11 As discussed previously, as contracts are relatively more incomplete (i.e., we reduce µ and compute the new equilibrium), a distortion worsens which reduces incentives to invest in technology. In the extreme case of contract incompleteness, rm growth is negligible even after 26 years (see Figure 1 , left panel). This directly aects the distribution of technology in the economy (Figure 1, right panel) .
The impact on the relevance of older and bigger rms, and the distribution of employment by age and size of rm in general, is considerable: as µ decreases the share of employment in these rms decreases (Figure 2 ). In the baseline parameterization exit rates vary from 0.10 (a target for our calibration), to 0.15.
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The economic consequences of contract incompleteness are economically signicant: in the extreme case of contract incompleteness output per worker falls by more than 30 percent relative to the baseline scenario (Figure 3 ). These losses are comparable to those found in the literature of nancial frictions.
11 For the quantitative analysis, and the results and graphs we report, we consider µ ∈ (0.01, 0.99). Unfortunately we are not able to map directly this parameter to measures of institutional quality across economies (nancial development is typically calibrated using the ratio of credit to GDP which is measurable and available in dierent economies). Caselli and Gennaioli (2013) argue that it is reasonable to consider that in some countries the judicial system is inecient to the extent that contract enforcement is non-existent. We believe an indirect approach for the estimation of µ at intermediate levels would capture frictions not directly related to contract enforcement. In the Appendix we provide empirical support for our quantitative results using cross-country information of legal institutions.
12 To the best of our knowledge, there does not seem to be a systematic pattern for exit and entry rates across economies with dierent levels of development, see Bartelsman et al. (2009) . A series of studies have documented the smaller size of rms in developing economies (Tybout, 2000; Poschke, 2014; Garcia-Santana and Ramos, 2015) .
Sensitivity Analysis
Next, we discuss the role of dierent key parameters for our quantitative results. Parameter α determines the degree of complementarity between inputs. As discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2007) , a higher α implies a higher elasticity of substitution between dierent intermediate inputs, thus every individual supplier becomes less essential in production, increasing the bargaining power of the rm producing a nal good. Thus, the distortion faced by the rm is decreasing in α. In our model, this eect inuences the incentives to invest in more advanced technologies and therefore life-cycle growth of rms (Figure 4 ).
Parameter α does not aect the allocation of resources with complete contracts, thus we do not have to recalibrate other parameters to analyze its role. This is not the case for parameter β. This will make the comparison of the dierent parameterizations less transparent as we need to modify other parameters to replicate the target moments discussed for the calibration. We keep the number of modied parameters to a minimum as described next.
In our model, parameter β determines the weight of the production function given to technology and intermediate inputs.
13 Relative to the baseline calibration 13 Acemoglu et al. (2007) consider a monopolistic competition model where β governs the elas-we reduce β to 0.40, and decrease the per-period xed cost of production c f and innovation parameter ξ, to keep exit rates and rm life-cycle growth on target. In particular, note that a signicant reduction in ξ is required, to 0.12 from the baseline value of 0.673. With a lower β, less weight is given to technology n and intermediate inputs, thus the negative eect of contract incompleteness is reduced relative to the baseline calibration ( Figure 5 ). It has also been shown that the bargaining power of the rm is decreasing in β.
Model with Production Capital
We modify the model by introducing capital in the production function, considering f (k, l) ν with f (k, l) = k θ l 1−θ , using a standard parameter of θ equal to 1/3. 14 The quantitative results are largely unchanged (Figure 6 ).
Final Comments
We have constructed a dynamic framework of heterogeneous rms to evaluate the impact of the enforcement of contracts between nal goods producers and suppliers on technology accumulation, rm life-cycle growth and aggregate productivity.
We have shown this friction implies a wedge on prots that is dependent on the technology level of the rm, and that this wedge aects not only the size of the rm but also the dynamic incentives to invest in technology and productivity within the rm.
This determines the life-cycle growth prole of rms and aggregate productivity, as ticity of demand. A span-of-control model (our approach) is isomorphic to the monopolistic competition model.
14 The main parameters are unchanged.
well as the age and size distribution of rms. Exploiting a theoretical framework similar to those employed in the literature to study rm entry costs, nancial and labor market frictions, among other obstacles faced by rms, we nd an economically signicant impact of contract enforcement.
In principle, rms could potentially mitigate the distortion caused by contractual incompleteness through vertical integration. This has received attention in the international trade literature (e.g., Antràs and Chor, 2013; Antràs and Helpman, 2006; Schwarz and Suedekum, 2014) . This possibility confronts the rm with a myriad of other obstacles, particularly in developing economies, that will limit its growth and increasing the complexity of the problem. First, contractual imperfections and monitoring technologies are important in explaining the lack of managerial delegation in developing economies (Laeven and Woodru, 2007; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013; Cole et al., 2016; Akcigit et al., 2016 , Grobov²ek, 2017 . Second, vertical integration may be costly and inecient (Boehm and Obereld, 2018) , and implies the rm is forced to invest to develop a product for which it has not accumulated know-how and human capital. Additionally, this production may be at a suboptimal scale if the production of the intermediate good is only for its own use. Third, as already discussed, nancial frictions will restrict rm growth while size-dependent distortions, in general, will become more severe as the rm becomes larger. A series of articles in the literature of misallocation consider the interaction of dierent frictions (e.g., Antunes and Cavalcanti, 2007; Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama, 2011; Asturias et al., 2016; Ranasinghe and Restuccia, 2018) . This direction of research could oer interesting results in the case of contractual frictions. Additionally, we have abstracted from the possibility that the ability to enforce contracts can alter the industrial structure and comparative advantage across economies (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007) .
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to explore the role of rm-supplier contract enforcement in a quantitative framework of rm dynamics. We believe there is ample room for further research. In addition to issues already discussed, dierent multilateral repeated bargaining protocols could be explored.
15 Based on our quantitative results, we have argued that frictions that distort the ability of rms to make contracts with suppliers are important.
15 Repeated bargaining does not eliminate ineciencies. We will not attempt to present an exhaustive set of references on multilateral bargaining. Cai (2003) , for example, studies a completeinformation alternating-oer bargaining game where some of the Markov Perfect Equilibria exhibit wasteful delays. Furthermore, the maximum number of delay periods that can be supported in this type of equilibria increases in the order of the square of the number of players. Cai (2003) provides additional references and an enumeration of potential sources of ineciencies in these models. Wolinsky (2000) analyzes a model of contracting and recontracting between a rm and its workers, where the unique stationary equilibrium is inecient. In many multilateral bagaining setups the share of the surplus obtained by the player making a proposal is decreasing in the number of players (Serrano, 2005) . In a setup similar to ours this could generate a wedge with similar disincentives to improve technology at the rm level (in our model technology is associated with the number of suppliers, or intermediate inputs of production).
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(A5) is a Cobb-Douglas function having x c and l as inputs, so it is strictly concave in x c and l as long as
which is equivalent to 1 > β + ν.
Proposition 1 shows that µ governs the wedge between input demand, labor and prots under complete contracts and under incomplete contracts. This wedge is decreasing in µ and disappears when µ = 1. One consequence of this proposition is that input demand, labor and prots are increasing in µ.
Proposition 1. Let
and denote by x c (n, z; µ) the demand for contractible inputs, x n (n, z; µ) the demand for noncontractible inputs, l i (n, z; µ) the demand for labor and y i (n, z; µ) production under incomplete contracts. Similarly, let x(n, z) be the demand for inputs, l c (n, z) the demand for labor and y(n, z) production under complete contracts. Then x c (z, n, k; µ) = h 1 (µ) x(z, n, k) x n (z, n, k; µ) = h 2 (µ) x c (z, n, k; µ) l i (z, n, k; µ) = h 1 (µ) l(z, n, k) and y i (n, z; µ) = h 1 (µ) β+ν h 2 (µ)
(1−µ)β y(n, z).
Furthermore, h 1 (µ) > 0, h 1 (1) = 1 and h 2 (µ) > 0, h 2 (1) = α α+β . Proof. First we will prove the properties of h i (µ). Noting that h 1 (1) = 1 and h 2 (1) = α α+β is straightforwad. To prove that h 1 (µ) > 0 consider f 1 (µ) ≡ (1 − β(1 − µ)) [ln (α + β − αβ(1 − µ)) − ln (1 − β(1 − µ))] + β(1 − µ) ln α. f 1 (µ) > 0 is equivalent to proving that h 1 (µ) > 0. Notice that f 1 (µ) = β ln α + β − αβ(1 − µ) α(1 − β(1 − µ)) − β α + β − αβ(1 − µ) .
Let a ≡ α + β − αβ(1 − µ) α(1 − β(1 − µ)) = 1 + β α(1 − β (1 − µ) ) .
Appendix B Empirical Motivation
We provide cross-country empirical motivation for the role of contract institutions in determining aggregate productivity and the average size of rms across economies. For example, Cole et al. (2016) use a similar approach to motivate nancial frictions using cross-country dierences in TFP. We regress (log) TFP from the Penn World Tables Database and (log) average rm size from Bento and Restuccia (2017) on various controls that represent variables that the literature has analyzed as important determinants of both TFP and average rm size. We nd suggestive evidence that the mechanism that we highlight in this article plays a statistically and economically signicant role.
We consider the Rule of Law Index (2017) (2018) , constructed by the World Justice Project. In particular we employ the subindex civil justice which takes into account information regarding whether civil justice is subject to unreasonable delays, eective enforcement, improper government inuence, accessibility and aordability of civil courts, among others. We also consider rm entry costs (in terms of income per capita, in logs), which have been found to be relevant in the literature (Barseghyan and DiCecio, 2011; Barseghyan, 2008) . 
